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Elara
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    verify_elara_recordAction

    Verify one signed Elara validation record entirely offline, in this browser. Checks structure, identity binding (the embedded public key must SHA3-256 to the claimed identity) and the ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) post-quantum signature over the record's canonical bytes. Returns {verdict, headline, checks[], reason}; verdict is VERIFIED, PARTIAL or FAILED. HONEST SCOPE: VERIFIED means the bytes are intact and the signer is who the record claims — it does NOT mean the record was accepted, sealed or time-anchored by any network, and it is not a statement that anyone was authorized to create it. INPUT MUST BE RAW TEXT: pass the record exactly as read from disk or network, never JSON.parse'd first — records carry u64 fields above JavaScript's 2^53 integer precision, and a parse/re-stringify round-trip corrupts the exact bytes the signature commits to (parsed objects are rejected with FAILED). Never throws: malformed input returns FAILED with the parse reason.

    View tool JSON
    {
      "name": "verify_elara_record",
      "kind": "act",
      "impl": "imperative",
      "description": "Verify one signed Elara validation record entirely offline, in this browser. Checks structure, identity binding (the embedded public key must SHA3-256 to the claimed identity) and the ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) post-quantum signature over the record's canonical bytes. Returns {verdict, headline, checks[], reason}; verdict is VERIFIED, PARTIAL or FAILED. HONEST SCOPE: VERIFIED means the bytes are intact and the signer is who the record claims — it does NOT mean the record was accepted, sealed or time-anchored by any network, and it is not a statement that anyone was authorized to create it. INPUT MUST BE RAW TEXT: pass the record exactly as read from disk or network, never JSON.parse'd first — records carry u64 fields above JavaScript's 2^53 integer precision, and a parse/re-stringify round-trip corrupts the exact bytes the signature commits to (parsed objects are rejected with FAILED). Never throws: malformed input returns FAILED with the parse reason.",
      "inputSchema": {
        "type": "object",
        "properties": {
          "record_json": {
            "type": "string",
            "description": "The validation record as RAW JSON text, exactly as read — never re-serialised from JSON.parse (u64 fields round above 2^53; see tool description)."
          }
        },
        "required": [
          "record_json"
        ]
      },
      "page": "/elara-mesh/verify/"
    }
    verify_mandate_bundleAction

    Check offline whether an agent was authorized to perform an act, under a scoped, revocable mandate. Input is a bundle {bundle_version, act, mandates[], revocations[]} of signed carrier records. Returns {verdict, authorized, principal, signer, lineage[], scope_deferred, soundness_caveats[], checks[], explanation, reason}. HONEST SCOPE: a CONSISTENT verdict proves the signatures and that authority held at the act's signed time GIVEN ONLY THE RECORDS IN THIS BUNDLE. It does NOT prove those records are sealed or time-anchored, and it CANNOT detect a revocation the bundle's author withheld — which is why the verdict is CONSISTENT and never AUTHORIZED. Read soundness_caveats before relying on it. INPUT MUST BE RAW TEXT: pass the bundle exactly as read, never JSON.parse'd first — act nonces are u64 and round above JavaScript's 2^53 integer precision, so a parse/re-stringify round-trip corrupts the signed bytes (parsed objects are rejected with FAILED). Never throws: malformed input returns FAILED.

    View tool JSON
    {
      "name": "verify_mandate_bundle",
      "kind": "act",
      "impl": "imperative",
      "description": "Check offline whether an agent was authorized to perform an act, under a scoped, revocable mandate. Input is a bundle {bundle_version, act, mandates[], revocations[]} of signed carrier records. Returns {verdict, authorized, principal, signer, lineage[], scope_deferred, soundness_caveats[], checks[], explanation, reason}. HONEST SCOPE: a CONSISTENT verdict proves the signatures and that authority held at the act's signed time GIVEN ONLY THE RECORDS IN THIS BUNDLE. It does NOT prove those records are sealed or time-anchored, and it CANNOT detect a revocation the bundle's author withheld — which is why the verdict is CONSISTENT and never AUTHORIZED. Read soundness_caveats before relying on it. INPUT MUST BE RAW TEXT: pass the bundle exactly as read, never JSON.parse'd first — act nonces are u64 and round above JavaScript's 2^53 integer precision, so a parse/re-stringify round-trip corrupts the signed bytes (parsed objects are rejected with FAILED). Never throws: malformed input returns FAILED.",
      "inputSchema": {
        "type": "object",
        "properties": {
          "bundle_json": {
            "type": "string",
            "description": "The mandate bundle envelope as RAW JSON text, exactly as read — never re-serialised from JSON.parse (u64 nonces round above 2^53; see tool description)."
          }
        },
        "required": [
          "bundle_json"
        ]
      },
      "page": "/elara-mesh/verify/"
    }
    explain_verdictAction

    Translate a verdict from verify_elara_record or verify_mandate_bundle into the claim it does and does NOT support. Use this before repeating a verdict to a user: it names the limits explicitly (integrity and signer identity — never 'authorized on a chain'; a bundle cannot reveal a revocation its author withheld; the artifact is a signed hash-linked evidence log, not a blockchain). Pure formatting over the verdict object you pass in — it re-verifies nothing and cannot report anything stronger than it was given.

    View tool JSON
    {
      "name": "explain_verdict",
      "kind": "act",
      "impl": "imperative",
      "description": "Translate a verdict from verify_elara_record or verify_mandate_bundle into the claim it does and does NOT support. Use this before repeating a verdict to a user: it names the limits explicitly (integrity and signer identity — never 'authorized on a chain'; a bundle cannot reveal a revocation its author withheld; the artifact is a signed hash-linked evidence log, not a blockchain). Pure formatting over the verdict object you pass in — it re-verifies nothing and cannot report anything stronger than it was given.",
      "inputSchema": {
        "type": "object",
        "properties": {
          "verdict_json": {
            "type": "string",
            "description": "A verdict object (or its JSON text) as returned by one of the verify tools."
          }
        },
        "required": [
          "verdict_json"
        ]
      },
      "page": "/elara-mesh/verify/"
    }